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Introduction 
Pension plan sponsors in the Netherlands are facing 
their second funding challenge in the past decade, 
this one more severe than the first.  Following the 
economic crash in 2008-2009, the funding levels of 
most plans fell below the 105-percent threshold set by 
the Dutch supervisor, De Nederlandsche Bank, which 
requires recovery of the minimum funding ratio 
within five years.  It is not yet clear, however, how 
plans will make up the deficits – except from profiting 
from a recovery of financial markets – and how the 
burden of any necessary adjustments will be spread 
among workers and retirees.  Although earlier in the 
decade most Dutch pension plans were restructured 
to include automatic reductions in benefit indexation 
if funding drops below given thresholds, that mecha-
nism may not be enough to achieve recovery this time 
around.  Policymakers now have to consider more 
substantial measures, including contribution increas-
es and nominal benefit cuts, actions few anticipated 
would be necessary. 
This brief proceeds as follows.  The first section 
describes the evolution of Dutch pension funds over 
the past decade.  The second section discusses the 
impact of the recent economic crisis on the pension 
funds.  The third section examines the implications of 
various policy options for intergenerational risk shar-
ing.  The final section concludes that policymakers 
should consider improved plan design when making 
solvency adjustments.
Evolution of the Dutch 
Pension System
Originating in the 1950s, pension funds in the Neth-
erlands were initially set up as traditional defined ben-
efit (DB) plans, similar to those in the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  Over the past quarter 
century, DB plans in those countries have largely been 
displaced by individual defined contribution (DC) 
plans, while most pension plans in the Netherlands 
maintained their DB structure.  Within this structure, 
however, the Dutch funds have undergone significant 
change.  In 2003, in the wake of the collapse in fund-
ing levels from the dot-com bust, the Dutch govern-
ment imposed strict funding requirements and new 
accounting rules.  In response, to improve risk man-
agement, most pension funds switched to ‘hybrid’ DB 
plans with conditional indexation, and some shifted 
even further to collective DC plans.1
By niels Kortleve and eduard ponds*Pensioners, therefore, face greater benefit risks under 
collective DC plans than they do under other arrange-
ments.  (See box below for a more detailed description 
of plan features.)
Stress Test: Economic Crisis 
of 2008-2009
Following the restructuring of most Dutch pension 
plans in the early 2000s, the average funding ratio 
slowly recovered (see Figure 1 on the next page).  
However, from 2007 onward, the funding ratio fell 
dramatically, from a high of 150 percent in mid-2007 
to less than 90 percent in the first quarter of 2009.  
The drop resulted from the combined effect of the 
worldwide fall in stock prices and the fall in nominal 
interest rates, which drove up the (market) value of 
the plan’s nominal liabilities.  Economic conditions 
deteriorated in particular in the fall of 2008, raising 
concerns that the default indexation adjustments 
might not be enough to recover the minimum fund-
ing level required.
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In DB plans with conditional indexation, benefits 
are calculated as in traditional DB plans except that 
indexation of pensions in payment and accrued ben-
efits is conditional on the plan’s funding status.  This 
relationship is often ruled via a “policy ladder” under 
which the indexation has a one-to-one relationship 
to the funding level.  Full indexation is given when 
the funding ratio is higher than a specified threshold, 
typically around 125 to 135 percent; no indexation is 
given when the ratio falls below a lower threshold, 
typically around 105 percent; and partial indexation is 
given when the ratio is in between these thresholds.  
A policy ladder may also include changes in contribu-
tion rates relative to the thresholds.  While pension 
fund policymakers have the final say in determining 
benefits and contribution rates, the policy ladders 
were intended to provide specific guidance to steer 
fund sponsors through difficult periods.
In collective DC plans, contribution rates are fixed.   
Benefits are calculated as in traditional DB plans, but 
indexation and nominal benefits are linked to the 
plan’s funding status.  As a result, nominal accrued 
benefits, and even nominal pensions in payment, may 
be cut if the funding ratio falls below a certain level.  
Key Characteristics of
The following are key features of the Netherlands’ 
600 pension plans (as of the end of 2008).  The first 
four apply to both DB plans with conditional index-
ation and collective DC plans, while uniform benefit 
cuts apply only to collective DC plans.
Uniform accrual rate •	 : Employees build up for 
each year of service around 2 percent of their 
(pensionable) wage as new pension rights.  For 
example, a career of 40 years gives a pension 
income of 80 percent of the average wage over 
the individual’s career – on average, around 70 
percent of final pay for most workers. 
Uniform contribution rate •	 : All employees pay 
the same contribution, which is set yearly such 
that the annual contributions match the present 
value of new accrued liabilities by employees 
due to an additional year of service, plus buffer 
requirements and indexation goals.2 
Uniform indexation rate •	 : The accrued benefits 
of all plan participants are indexed yearly in a 
uniform way.  Usually the aim is to index with 
the wage growth rate of the industry or the 
company offering the pension fund.  A number 
of pension funds differentiate in their index-
ation policy for employees (indexation linked to 
wages) and retirees (indexation linked to price 
inflation).  The actual indexation rate is condi-
tional on the financial position of the pension 
fund.   
Uniform asset mix •	 : Pension fund wealth is held 
in one asset mix. 
Uniform reduction in nominal benefits •	 : While DB 
plans have conditional indexation, the nominal 
level of benefits does not change.  In contrast, 
in collective DC plans, nominal benefits – both 
accrued and in payment status – can be reduced 
if needed.  Any such policy would likely be 
imposed as a uniform percentage reduction for 
all plan participants.  This provision will most 
impact participants with the highest pension 
accrual: those about to retire and those recently 
retired.
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Figure 1. nominal Funding ratio of a typical 
dutch pension plan, Q1 1999-Q2 2009
 
Source: Authors’ calculations.
path to recovery.  In addition, the excess return earned 
above the nominal rate of interest used to discount li-
abilities will contribute to improved funding.  Howev-
er, given the severity of the problem, these stabilizing 
forces may not be enough – additional measures may 
be necessary to speed the recovery.
A number of policy options could help restore 
funding more quickly than just waiting for finan-
cial markets to recover.  Table 1 lists three possible 
approaches; each would have different effects on 
intergenerational redistribution.4  Under Option 
1, the fund takes no additional actions beyond the 
automatic suspension of benefit indexation.  Option 
2 would take the additional step of increasing con-
tribution rates by 2.5 percent.  Option 3 would keep 
contribution rates the same but would, if necessary, 
cut nominal benefits of current retirees.
Figure 2. pension plans with Funding ratios 
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Source: De Nederlandsche Bank (2009). 
Figure 2 shows that in September 2008, only 12 
percent of Dutch pension funds had funding ratios 
below the required 105-percent level.  Just five months 
later, the share of plans falling below this standard 
had soared to 85 percent.
table 1. selected policy options for restoring 
pension solvency 
Option 1 No extra measures beyond automatic 
suspension of benefit indexation
Option 2  Additional worker contributions of  
2.5 percent in case of underfunding
Option 3 Benefit cuts after three years in case of 
underfunding
Source: Authors’ illustrations. 
Using an Asset-Liability Management (ALM) 
framework, each option is measured against a com-
mon baseline: the pre-crash funding status at the start 
of 2008.  All of the options begin at the end of 2008, 
when funding ratios were 95 percent.  The options 
are evaluated over a 15-year period and, for purposes 
of the analysis, the fund is assumed to be closed at 
the end of the period with the wealth distributed 
among the participants in proportion to the value of 
their nominal benefits.5  The value of participants’ net 
wealth in the pension fund (benefits to be received 
minus contributions to be paid) provides insight on 
the impact of generational redistribution.  
Figure 3 on the next page shows the generational 
effects of each option.  A positive bar means that the 
generation benefits in the coming 15 years; a negative 
bar implies the opposite – that the generation, on bal-
ance, loses.  The bars, taken as a whole, sum to zero 
because whatever one generation gains, the other 
loses.  The figure shows that – given that the plan is 
Closing the Funding Gap
When a pension fund falls below the 105-percent 
threshold, the Dutch supervisor requires it to close 
the gap within five years.3  In response to underfund-
ing, most Dutch pension funds will automatically sus-
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underfunded – the continuation of the fund with no 
additional measures (Option 1) is more beneficial for 
older participants than younger participants.  While 
the older participants will share some pain through 
reduced indexation, they will continue to receive their 
full nominal benefits in the coming 15 years.  If the 
fund recovers in the not-too-distant future, they will 
even get partial indexation.  The working generations, 
however, will lose.  They will pay more contributions 
than the value of new accrued benefits in the coming 
15 years because the actual indexation falls behind full 
indexation.  At the same time, part of the contribu-
tions of the active members will be used to pay out 
full nominal benefits to current and future retirees 
and to also possibly provide partial indexation for this 
group.
In Option 2, workers pay additional contributions 
– 2.5 percent of the pensionable wage6 – for as long 
as the plan is underfunded.  As Figure 2 shows, the 
redistribution from young to old increases compared 
with the default scenario of Option 1.  For the younger 
members, the difference between the value of con-
tributions and the value of accrued benefits further 
increases, since they have to pay extra contributions 
without receiving any additional benefits.  For the 
older members, the recovery of the funding ratio is 
accelerated, so that on balance, more indexation is 
paid in the coming 15 years, which means they get 
higher benefits.
Option 3 allows for cuts in the accrued nominal 
benefits.  This option is modeled like Option 1, but 
after three years, a cut in nominal benefits equals 
the size of the recovery gap at the end of the three-
year period.  The redistribution from young to old is 
reduced considerably, as the cut in nominal benefits 
shifts more of the recovery burden to the elderly.
Regardless of the path back to solvency, the 
importance of the generational distribution issue sug-
gests that structural changes in the design of Dutch 
pension funds may be ripe for consideration.  These 
changes could introduce age differentiation into 
benefit and investment policies.  For example, plans 
could adopt an age-dependent indexation rule that 
would tie indexation for younger participants to the 
real rate of return on some specified asset mix, such 
as the pension fund asset portfolio.  For older plan 
members, it would provide (almost) certain full index-
ation at all times.  Another idea is to move away from 
a uniform asset mix by replacing the current structure 
with a two-fund model, one for younger participants 
and the other for older members.  The fund targeting 
young plan members would have a high risk profile, 
while the fund for the elderly would have a low risk 
profile.  Plan participants would move gradually from 
the first fund to the second.  Further analysis and 
discussion of such options is needed, but they could 
offer a promising way forward.7
Conclusion
The financial crisis of 2008-09 has provided a stress 
test for the Dutch pension system.  It appears that 
the more flexible defined benefit structure adopted 
by most plans earlier in the decade, which relies on 
indexation adjustments to restore solvency, may not 
be sufficient for the funds to recover fully.  In re-
sponse, policymakers should try to find approaches to 
compensate for the funding deficits in ways that best 
distribute risk among participating generations.  In 
addition to the funding increases or nominal benefit 
cuts that may be needed in the wake of the crisis, 
policymakers should think more broadly about im-
proving the design of pension funds going forward 
– through, for example, introducing age differentia-
tion – to more effectively and fairly distribute risk by 
generations.
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Figure 3. intergenerational redistribution of 
selected policy options, 2010-2025, euros per 
Year per Full-time equivalent
Note: The x-axis is cohorts with their age in 2008, and the 
y-axis is transfer from cohort (-) to cohort (+).
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Endnotes
1  For more details, see Ponds and van Riel (2009).
2  There are some exceptions, especially for funds 
with lower indexation goals.
3  The requirement was changed during the recent 
financial crisis from three years to five years.  In addi-
tion to this short-term target, pension funds have to 
restore funding to a solvency ratio of 125 percent (for 
an average fund) within 15 years.
4  Boeijen, et al. (2009).
5  For example, as the funding ratio at the end of 
2008 was equal to 95 percent, immediate closing of 
the fund would imply that all participants get 95 euro-
cents for each euro in accrued nominal liabilities.
6  This amount is roughly equal to 2 percent of salary.
7  For more details on age differentiation policies, 
see Kortleve and Ponds (2009) and Molenaar, et al. 
(2008).
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